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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici are seven nationally recognized professors
and scholars of the First Amendment. Each has
authored multiple publications on the freedoms of
speech, association, and peaceable assembly and the
history of those freedoms. Their scholarship and
experience lead them to conclude that it is vital for the
Court to intervene now to reject the Fifth Circuit’s
crabbed interpretation of the right of peaceable
assembly and to prevent chilling constitutionally
protected activities.
As the Petition explains, the Fifth Circuit flatly
contradicted this Court’s precedents when it green-lit
tort damages against a protest organizer simply
because a protest participant—on his own accord and
absent direction from the protest organizer—
committed a violent act. As amici can attest, the
decision also represents a sharp break with the robust
protection of political assemblies and broad conception
of “peaceable” that prevailed for centuries, going back
to the early Republic. Given the modern regulatory
environment for protests, absent review, the Fifth
Circuit’s rule will inexorably stifle peaceful political
dissent that has, until now, fallen squarely within the
core of the First Amendment’s protection. The
Appendix lists all amici.

1 Counsel

of record for all parties received timely advance
notice of intent to file and consented to the filing of this brief. S.
Ct. R. 37(2)(a). No counsel for any party authored this brief in
whole or in part, and no person or entity other than amici curiae
or their counsel made a monetary contribution intended to fund
the brief’s preparation or submission.

(1)
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INTRODUCTION
AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Fifth Circuit transformed tort liability into a
truncheon for opponents to suppress political activism
across the ideological spectrum, from gun rights
demonstrators to Black Lives Matter protesters. Its
holding that the First Amendment does not shield a
public speaker at a political protest from a civil
negligence claim where a third party causes physical
harm—even though the third party’s unlawful act was
not directed, authorized, or ratified by that speaker—
vitiates the promise of the First Amendment. In the
American constitutional tradition, while protesters
can be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions, only violence, whether by an individual or
by several in concert, nullifies the protections of the
First Amendment.
The constitutional significance of the line
between violence and nonviolence is cemented in the
text of the Constitution, which protects the right to
“peaceably” assemble. State supreme court decisions
applying the common law crimes of riot and unlawful
assembly—crimes that required significant levels of
violence—exemplify
the
broad
constitutional
protection for street protests, with courts refusing to
sanction participants in public assemblies unless they
personally engaged in violence that threatened the
peace. Nineteenth-century state courts routinely
displayed great tolerance for disruptive crowds,
providing broad constitutional cover for people
gathered outdoors and on the public streets, so long as
they did not engage in violence. As an 1889 Illinois
appellate court emphasized, “[u]nder a popular
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government like ours, the law allows great latitude to
public demonstrations, whether religious, political or
social, and it is against the genius of our institutions
to resort to repressive measures . . . to encroach on
[such] fundamental rights.” Trotter v. City of Chi., 33
Ill. App. 206, 208 (Ill. App. Ct. 1889) (striking down as
unlawful one of the first municipal permit
requirements for street parades), aff’d, 26 N.E. 359
(Ill. 1891).
DeRay McKesson, like the advocates for racial
equality in the mid-twentieth century, “sought to
change a social order . . . [t]hrough speech, assembly,
and petition—rather than through riot or revolution.”
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912
(1982). Whether one shares his political views, his
choice to do so is as American as the Constitution
itself. To ensure the continued vitality of the First
Amendment, this Court should grant certiorari and
reaffirm that absent evidence “that the group itself
possessed unlawful goals and that the individual held
a specific intent to further those illegal aims,” id. at
920, the First Amendment precludes the imposition of
“[c]ivil liability . . . merely because an individual
belonged to a group, some members of which
committed acts of violence.” Id.
The Fifth Circuit’s departure from this Court’s
precedents—as well as centuries of common law and
constitutional tradition—creates a grave and urgent
risk to political dissent. Hinging its novel theory of
civil liability on a protest organizer committing an
unlawful act provides no limiting principle in the
modern era when protests are meticulously regulated.
The sheer volume of regulation virtually guarantees
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that today any large gathering will engage in some
technical violation of this or that time, place, or
manner restriction. Nor do ordinary tort principles
regarding the foreseeability of harm provide
meaningful controls on the imposition of liability for
other people’s independent, unprompted violent acts.
It would be the rare case where a protest organizer—
especially of a large, controversial protest—could
reasonably expect that no one in a crowd of thousands
would engage in some violent act. The Fifth Circuit’s
rule thus significantly raises the costs of dissent and
threatens to shut down critically important political
speech. The Court should intervene to avoid the
wholesale stifling of public protest.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Fifth Circuit’s Crabbed View Of The
First Amendment Upends Centuries-Old
Decisions
Protecting
Peaceful
Participants At Public Assemblies.

A bedrock principle, dating back to the Founding,
is that the right to peaceable assembly protects a
participant at a public assembly from being held
responsible for other protesters’ violence unless that
participant either also commits a violent act or incites
another to commit a violent act—even if that
participant engages in acts that are disruptive or
unlawful. By refusing to provide First Amendment
protection to a protest leader because “he ‘negligently’
led a protest that carried the risk of potential violence
or urged the blocking of a road,” Pet. App. 51a (Willett,
J., dissenting in relevant part), the Fifth Circuit defied
that principle.
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There is no question that the individual who
injured Police Officer Doe stepped outside the
boundaries of constitutional protection by engaging in
violence. But until now, centuries of precedent would
have shielded protest organizer McKesson’s
purportedly illegal yet unquestionably nonviolent
conduct from punishment or civil damages for
another’s separate act of violence. Impassioned
crowds, angry at perceived abuses of governmental
power, are frequently disruptive, yet they have
consistently received constitutional protection as
peaceable assemblies, even when the protest
transgresses some municipal restriction. Properly
understood, the Fifth Circuit’s decision is a sharp
departure from both this Court’s precedent and the
Founding-era understanding of the right of peaceable
assembly, as reflected in the Constitution’s text and
state court decisions from the nineteenth century
onward.
A.

The Right to Peaceable Assembly
Has Long Been Understood to
Protect Participation in Even
Unruly
Assemblies,
Absent
Significant Violence.

Discordant “[p]olitical uprisings, from peaceful
picketing to lawless riots, have marked our history
from the beginning—indeed, from before the
beginning.” Pet. App. 52a (Willett, J., dissenting).
When “[t]he Sons of Liberty . . . dump[ed] tea into
Boston Harbor almost two centuries [ago],” id., the
Americans saw the act as falling within their protected
liberties, despite their trespass and defacement of
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private property. See generally JOHN PHILLIP REID, IN
A DEFIANT STANCE: THE CONDITIONS OF LAW IN
MASSACHUSETTS BAY, THE IRISH COMPARISON, AND THE
COMING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 90 (1977)
(noting that during the Revolutionary period in
Boston, the Riot Act was never read by magistrates,
who understood the political aims of the revolutionary
crowds).
Given the historical importance of public
protests, the First Amendment singles out this
particular form of expressive conduct for explicit
constitutional protection. Moreover, its text draws a
sharp divide between violent and nonviolent
assemblies by providing for “the right of the people
peaceably to assemble,” U.S. CONST. amend. I; see
Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 916 (“The First
Amendment does not protect violence.”). That right
had a well-understood meaning of excluding violent
acts, but otherwise covering unruly and unlawful acts.
The First Amendment sought generally to
expand the customary constitutional rights of British
citizens to freedom of expression and conscience.
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 265 (1941) (“No
purpose in ratifying the Bill of Rights was clearer than
that of securing for the people of the United States
much greater freedom of religion, expression,
assembly, and petition than the people of Great
Britain had ever enjoyed.”). And the right to peaceably
assemble was intended to be broader than the British
customary right in three important respects.
First, the First Amendment ensured that the
right of peaceable assembly included a right to “use . . .
the streets and public places” for “purposes of assembly
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. . . and discussing public questions,” as “a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of
citizens.” Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939)
(Roberts, J., concurring). This “declaration of a
freedom of assembly was a break from [English]
history,” because in Britain, “the people were not free
to assemble in the streets and parks without official
permission.” Michael McConnell, Freedom by
Association,
FIRST
THINGS
(Aug.
2012),
https://tinyurl.com/w3ebodt.
Second, in “its original meaning” the term
“peaceable” was not “to be confused with ‘legal’ or
‘permissible.’” LEON WHIPPLE, OUR ANCIENT
LIBERTIES: THE STORY OF THE ORIGIN AND MEANING OF
CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
104 (1927). Merely illegal acts did not necessarily
deprive one of constitutional protection. Instead,
violent acts were the constitutional deal-breaker.
Third, the bar for the requisite level of violence to
render an assembly non-peaceable was high. The First
Amendment’s shield disappeared only when an
assembly had descended into a “riot” or “unlawful
assembly,” common law crimes that, as explained
below, were narrowly construed by American courts
and generally applied only to personally violent
participants. 2 See Riots, Routs, and Unlawful
2 Historically, the only significant departure from this rule
occurred in cases where an individual, who had heretofore
undertaken no violence, refused to disperse after an order to
disperse under a Riot Act had been read. See FRANCIS WHARTON,
A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 827 (3d
ed. 1855) (noting that after the command to disperse an unlawful
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Assemblies, 3 AM. L. MAG. 350, 357 (1844) (arguing
that American law preserved the common law of riot
and unlawful assembly because gatherings “which
look to violence and not to reason and the influence of
a strong expression of public opinion, do not fall within
the protection of the constitutional guarantees”). As
summarized in an 1899 treatise, although “the right of
the people peaceably to assemble . . . does not prevent
interference with the riotous assemblages of the
people; where there is no riotous conduct the
government cannot interfere.” 2 JOHN RANDOLPH
TUCKER, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 326 (Henry St. George Tucker ed., 1899) (emphasis
added).
B.

State Court Common Law Decisions
Confirm That Unruly Assemblies,
Including Those Engaged in Illegal
Activity,
Were
Considered
Peaceable in the Absence of a
Conspiracy to Commit Violence.

Early American courts are notorious for having
routinely held individuals criminally and civilly
responsible for their libelous, indecent, obscene, and
blasphemous speech. But in stark contrast to their
narrow intuitions about individual free speech, these
same courts routinely vindicated an expansive
assembly, “[t]hose who continue looking on while the active
rioters are resisting public authorities . . . ; who refuse to join with
authorities . . . are just as much rioters as those most active in
the work of violence”); see also id. at 822–23, 826–27.
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conception of the people’s right of assembly, especially
for political purposes.
Nineteenth-century state court decisions before
the incorporation of the First Amendment against the
states, see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925), reinforce that the relevant line for purposes of
constitutional protection of street crowds is violence,
not unlawfulness. The widespread refusal by
nineteenth-century state courts to countenance
advance-approval requirements for protests confirms
that the right of peaceable assembly was understood
to sweep broadly, covering unruly and even unlawful
crowds except for the few participants who personally
engaged in violence.3
1. In the early years, constitutional protection
was understood to extend to all assemblies that did not
fit the common law crimes of riot and unlawful
assembly, crimes that early American courts
construed narrowly. See Riots, Routs, and Unlawful
Assemblies, 3 AM. L. MAG. 350, 354 (1844) (American
“courts of justice will require the characters of an
unlawful assembly to be more distinctly marked” as
compared to England).

The Court has since accepted the constitutionality of
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. Nineteenthcentury cities did not impose such restrictions on activities
associated with the right of assembly, including parades,
marches, and outdoor public meetings, however, and when such
restrictions were first imposed, courts generally rejected them.
See Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 56
UCLA L. REV. 543, 545 (2009).
3
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While English common law authorities divided on
the scope and breadth of these crimes, 4 American
courts, both before and after incorporation, narrowly
construed the crimes of unlawful assembly and riot,
elevating the importance of proof of imminent
violence. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 68 S.E. 945, 946 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1910) (Georgia statute was an “extension of
the offense of riot . . . beyond its common-law
definition, so that the commission . . . of a lawful act
in a violent and tumultuous manner is made a crime”)
(emphasis added). These state courts interpreted the
common law crime of riot as applying to either a lawful
or unlawful act so long as the act was undertaken
violently. See Commonwealth v. Kahn, 176 A. 242, 243
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1935) (construing the crime of riot as
“a tumultuous disturbance of the peace by three or
more persons assembled and acting with a common
intent; either in executing a lawful private enterprise
in a violent and turbulent manner, to the terror of the
people, or in executing an unlawful enterprise in a
violent and turbulent manner.”) (emphasis added); see
also FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 825 (3d ed. 1855)
(clarifying that “[a] riot is a tumultuous disturbance of
the public peace by three persons or more assembling
together . . . with an intent mutually to assist one
another against any who shall oppose them . . . and
afterwards executing the same in a violent and
4

See generally John Inazu, Unlawful Assembly As Social
Control, 64 UCLA L. REV. 2, 10-11 (2017) (noting that William
Blackstone embraced a narrower conception that required
violence while William Hawkins appeared to countenance
nonviolent lawbreaking as falling withing the crime).
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turbulent manner, to the terror of the people, whether
the act intended is lawful or unlawful”) (emphasis
added).
Violence to persons or property was an
irreducible minimum requirement of the offense of
riot. See, e.g., Taylor, 68 S.E. at 946 (holding crime of
riot extended only to jointly executed lawful acts
“involving violence, and in the execution of which
violence was actually employed”); JOHN WILDER MAY,
THE LAW OF CRIMES §§ 165–166 (Harry Augustus
Bigelow, ed., 3d ed. 1905) (emphasizing that the crime
turned on the element of violence, not lawfulness, and
that “[t]he Violence Necessary to constitute a riot need
not actually be inflicted upon any person” so long as
the threat of violence is present through weaponry or
context). As an 1855 treatise writer elaborated:
It must be shown that the assembling was
accompanied with . . . circumstances, either of
actual force or violence, or at least of an apparent
tendency thereto, as were calculated to inspire
people with terror, such as being armed, using
threatening speeches, turbulent gestures, or the
like. If an assembly of persons be not accompanied
with such circumstances as these, it can never be
deemed a riot, however unlawful their intent, or
however unlawful the acts which they commit.
WHARTON, supra, at 825–826 (emphasis added).
The common law crime of unlawful assembly
likewise required violence on the part of the
individuals involved. In Rollins v. Shannons, 292 F.
Supp. 580 (E.D. Mo. 1968) (per curiam), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 401 U.S. 988 (1971), a
federal district court upheld the constitutionality of
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Missouri’s unlawful assembly statute after finding it
was “basically a codification of the common law offense
of unlawful assembly,” which was “[h]istorically . . . a
lesser included offense in the riot laws.” 292 F. Supp.
at 589. The statute proscribed the assembly of three or
more persons “to do any unlawful act, with force or
violence, against the person or property of another, or
against the peace or to the terror of the people.” Id.
As the Rollins court noted, the “essential fault” of
the breach-of-the-peace statutes held unconstitutional
in Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963),
and Cox. v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), was “their
ability to be applied to prohibit peaceful conduct.” 292
F. Supp. at 591. Missouri’s unlawful assembly statute,
by contrast—like the common law of unlawful
assembly—only encompassed acts which violated the
state’s criminal law and which were “intended to be
done with force or violence, thus removing [them] from
the ambit of peaceful conduct protected by the First
Amendment.” Id.; see also Owens v. Commonwealth,
179 S.E.2d 477, 480–81 (Va. 1971) (striking down
Virginia’s
unlawful
assembly
statute
as
“unconstitutionally overbroad” in part because it
rendered any unpermitted assembly an “unlawful
assembly,” while contrasting it to “the common law
definition [that] expressly requires clear and present
danger of violent conduct”); accord WHARTON, supra,
at 825 (“Any tumultuous disturbance of the public
peace by three persons or more” could not be charged
with unlawful assembly where the group had a
“avowed, ostensible, legal or constitutional object”).
The scope of liability for common law riot and
unlawful assembly was limited, moreover, to the
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specific individuals who actually and intentionally
joined with others to commit violence. See, e.g.,
Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985, 996 n.10a (N.D.
Ga. 1967) (per curiam) (recognizing that Georgia’s riot
act applied “solely to acts of violence by two or more
persons acting in concert”); Schlamp v. State, 891 A.2d
327, 330–333 (Md. 2006) (reversing conviction for
uncodified crime of riot after an exhaustive analysis of
the requisite level of culpability, as well as violence,
under the common law); United States v. Matthews,
419 F.2d 1177, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Skelly Wright,
J., dissenting) (refusing to join a decision upholding
the constitutionality of the District of Columbia’s riot
statute because it “remove[d] any requirement that a
defendant personally engage in violent or tumultuous
conduct,” a significant departure from the common
law).
2. Despite being congested and routinely plagued
by the inconvenience associated with public parades
and processions, nineteenth-century cities did not
require people assembling outdoors to obtain permits
to access the city streets. “As late as 1881, Chicago,
Denver, Detroit, St. Paul, and San Francisco had no
permit requirements for assemblies in their streets.”
Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly,
56 UCLA L. REV. 543, 545 (2009). Even New York City,
did not require permits for street processions until
July 7, 1914 or for street meetings until after 1931. Id.
Although reasonable permit requirements are
accepted today as constitutional, when the first permit
requirements for street meetings and parades were
adopted, they met with significant judicial skepticism.
The widespread reluctance of early courts to allow
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authorities to regulate peaceable crowds in advance
confirms that the American tradition of peaceable
assembly encompassed unruly and even unlawful
public gatherings.
The near universal view, among state courts, was
that these types of ordinances were void. “All but one
of the first state supreme courts asked to review
ordinances that required advance permission to
gather in public places found them void,” the sole
outlier being the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court. Id. at 570.5
Anderson v. City of Wellington, 19 P. 719 (Kan.
1888), is illustrative. The precise legal question before
the Supreme Court of Kansas was whether a
municipal ordinance requiring advance permission to
access public streets for parades was “reasonable, not
inconsistent with the laws of the state, not repugnant
to the fundamental rights, . . . not . . . oppressive, . . .
not . . . partial or unfair, . . . and . . . not [in]
contraven[tion of] common right.” Id. at 721. In
rejecting the reasonableness of the ordinance, the
court stressed how it would “prevent[] a public address
upon any subject being made on the streets[,]” or “an
unusual congregation of people on the streets, under
5

These same courts evidenced no similar skepticism when
they were asked to approve regulations of individual expression
in the streets. Abu El-Haj, supra, at 577 (explaining that
nineteenth-century state courts upheld analogous time, place,
and manner regulations of street music because music did not
directly implicate their understanding of the people’s right to
assemble in public).
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any circumstances, without permission.” Id. This
would be “an abridgement of the rights of the people”
because it “[took] from the people of a city and the
surrounding country a privilege exercised by them in
every locality throughout the land—to form their
processions and parade the streets with banners,
music, songs, and shouts.” Id. at 721–22.
Equally important, the court rejected the
suggestion that the ordinance could be justified on the
grounds of preserving order, because “the laws upon
the subject of riots, mobs, unlawful assemblies, and
nuisances . . . already afford ample protection to the
public, and ready processes to prohibit, repress and
arrest offenders” who violate those laws. Id. at 722.
Many other nineteenth-century courts agreed.
The Michigan Supreme Court invalidated an
ordinance requiring permission from officials to march
through city streets, rejecting the city’s proffer that
the ordinance was justified by either its authority “to
prevent . . . riots, disturbances, and disorderly
assemblages” or its power “to control, prescribe, and
regulate the manner in which highways, streets, . . .
[and] public grounds . . . [are used] within [the] city.”
Frazee’s Case, 30 N.W. 72, 74 (Mich. 1886). The court
acknowledged the foreseeability that such assemblies
were “capable of perversion to bad uses” and
“sometimes very great dangers.” Id. at 75. Yet it
emphasized that constitutional protection for such
crowds only ceased “[w]hen people assemble in riotous
mobs.” Id.
Likewise, even as an Illinois appellate court
acknowledged that a public gathering “may be so
conducted . . . as to invite a breach of the peace, or to
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render itself a nuisance”—i.e., in modern tort-speak,
that some protests have a foreseeable risk of negative
consequences—the court emphasized that these are
“exceptional” occurrences, and laws governing riot and
unlawful assembly already provide sufficient
“restraint of law.” Trotter v. City of Chi., 33 Ill. App.
206, 208 (Ill. App. Ct. 1889), aff’d, 26 N.E. 359 (Ill.
1891).
These early cases show how far the Fifth Circuit’s
ruling departs not just from this Court’s precedent,
but from long-established customary constitutional
law—embodied in the First Amendment’s reference to
peaceable assembly—of protecting the right to
assemble while policing only those individuals who
encourage or engage in riotous violence. The Fifth
Circuit’s view that stepping into the street in violation
of Baton Rouge’s municipal laws makes a protest
organizer liable for violence that he did not direct,
incite, or ratify cannot be squared with the First
Amendment and cries out for this Court’s review.
II.

The Fifth Circuit’s Rule Virtually
Guarantees Tort Liability for Protest
Organizers, Stifling Critically Important
Political Dissent.

The Fifth Circuit’s repudiation of the historical
understanding of peaceable assembly poses an
especially daunting threat, given the expanse of
modern protest management regulation. With today’s
detailed time, place, and manner requirements and
open-ended “disturbing the peace”-type misdemeanors
(measures that nineteenth-century courts would not
have countenanced), the Fifth Circuit’s purported
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limiting principle—premising civil liability for entirely
distinct violent acts by third parties on violations of
unrelated laws—is no limit at all. Hereinafter, any
protest organizer—however careful—will be exposed
to the possibility of tort liability on the grounds of
foreseeability, and will face the certainty of costly
litigation. The Fifth Circuit’s decision, if left standing,
will stifle important speech on matters of public
concern.
A.

The Fifth Circuit’s Negligence
Theory Threatens to Transform
Every Minor “Unlawful” Act into a
Potentially Ruinous Civil Lawsuit.

In contrast to the nineteenth century, when
courts shunned permit requirements for protests and
other public gatherings, modern protest organizers
face a dizzying array of restrictions and limitations on
public speech and assembly. These restrictions consist
of detailed permit schemes, spatial tactics such as
“free speech zones,” various limits on the time, place,
and manner of public protest, and public order
regulations that police enforce with considerable
discretion. See generally Timothy Zick, Speech and
Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. 581 (2006).
Municipalities today typically regulate all public
assemblies before they occur, through detailed permit
requirements. Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected
Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA L. REV. 543, 548 (2009)
(survey of twenty large American municipalities
reveals
extensive
public-gathering
permit
requirements). Those who wish to assemble to protest
special events such as the Democratic National
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Convention or meetings of the WTO must also
navigate complicated temporary restrictions. E.g.
Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colo. Springs, 477
F.3d 1212 (10th Cir. 2007) (upholding a city’s security
zone around a NATO conference that was “completely
closed to all persons except conference attendees,”
media, hotel employees, and local residents). See
generally TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS (2009).
Beyond such time, place, and manner
regulations—generally criminally enforceable in
themselves—local governments use a panoply of
misdemeanor offenses to regulate public crowds. So
even protesters who are exercising their rights in an
unquestionably lawful manner face the risk of being
charged with an array of public order offenses.
Catchall offenses such as “disorderly conduct” or
“breach of the peace” are enforced with considerable
discretion. Even though such charges are routinely
dropped or dismissed by courts, these arrests impact
and chill the exercise of First Amendment rights. See,
e.g., Powers v. City of Ferguson, 229 F. Supp. 3d 894,
897 (E.D. Mo. 2017) (reporting Department of Justice
“found that City of Ferguson police officers frequently
relied on the failure-to-comply ordinance to arrest
individuals without probable cause and to infringe on
or retaliate against free expression”); Vodak v. City of
Chi., 639 F.3d 738, 740, 744 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting
that 900 people swept up in mass arrest were released
without charges).
In this heavily regulated and highly charged
environment, if technical misdemeanor violations
mean a protest organizer “should have known” that a
protest will result in some “confrontation between
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police and the mass of demonstrators,” Pet. App. 12a,
then it is effectively always reasonably foreseeable
that such a confrontation will occur. Allowing the
victim of a violent act at a protest to recover damages
from the protest organizer based on the allegedly
foreseeable consequences of even minor legal
infractions provides no boundary for tort liability,
forcefully chilling contemporary protest organization
and participation.
The breathtaking sweep of the Fifth Circuit’s
rule, even if limited to criminal acts, can be illustrated
by just a few examples where “criminal” acts could
justify the imposition of civil liability on a gathering’s
organizer for the unconnected, unauthorized acts of
third parties:


Failure to abide by the terms of a protest
permit by, for example, playing music too
loudly;



Refusal to use a designated “free speech
zone”;



Unauthorized use of a street or sidewalk
by protest participants; or



Citation for taking too long to pack up.

Today, “governments . . . regulate our lives finely,
acutely, thoroughly, and exhaustively” and “criminal
laws have grown . . . to cover so much previously
innocent conduct that almost anyone can be arrested
for something. If the state could use these laws not for
their intended purposes but to silence those who voice
unpopular ideas, little would be left of our First
Amendment liberties.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct.
1715, 1730 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and
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dissenting in part); see also Arielle W. Tolman & David
M. Shapiro, From City Council to the Streets:
Protesting Police Misconduct after Lozman v. City of
Riviera Beach, 13 CHARLESTON L. REV. 49, 60–66
(2018) (noting breadth of crimes of modern statutory
unlawful assembly, failure to disperse, and disorderly
conduct, like noise ordinances, give police leeway to
stifle public expression, particularly that which is
critical of modern policing). If minor infractions of
municipal laws mean that a peaceful protest organizer
can be subject to damages liability for violent acts that
he did not direct, encourage, or ratify, the right of
peaceable assembly would be shrunk to zero.
B.

Normal Tort Principles Provide No
Limiting Principle in the Protest
Context,
Dramatically
Stifling
Dissent.

The liability regime the Fifth Circuit has created
knows no bounds. Normal tort principles of the
foreseeability of harm essentially guarantee damages
in this context—or at least ruinous litigation—because
it is the rare case where a protest organizer could not
foresee some violence, however discouraged. This
Court has recognized as much. See Claiborne
Hardware, 458 U.S. at 918–19 (noting that nearly
every protest involves both lawful and unlawful
actions). Particularly for protests involving important
matters of public concern—where First Amendment
protection is most urgently needed—there is a higher
likelihood of drawing counter-protesters and a robust
police response, increasing the odds of generating
confrontations at the margins.
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Despite the absence of a credible allegation that
McKesson “authorized, ratified, or directly threatened
acts of violence,” Pet. App. 41a (Willett, J., dissenting
in relevant part) (quoting Claiborne Hardware, 458
U.S. at 929), or met the threshold of incitement, id. at
42a–44a, the Fifth Circuit held that the First
Amendment did not shield McKesson from damages
for a third party’s acts because he “should have
known” that moving the protest into the street was
“likely to provoke a confrontation between police and
the mass of demonstrators,” id. at 12a (majority
opinion). But this “reasonably foreseeable harm”
standard vitiates First Amendment protection for
street protesters everywhere.
There is almost always a “foreseeable” risk of
violence associated with outdoor street protests, even
those that are predominantly nonviolent. Throughout
American history, “outdoor assemblies [have] exist[ed]
on a continuum from peaceful to disruptive, and . . .
that disruption can range from illegal acts that are
principally inconvenient to violent acts against other
individuals.” Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Defining Peaceably:
Policing the Line Between Constitutionally Protected
Protest and Unlawful Assembly, 80 MO. L. REV. 961,
965 (2015).
The risk is most foreseeable for organizers of
larger, more politically salient demonstrations where
police are more likely to be present. Police not only
enforce regulations (triggering the Fifth Circuit’s
“limit”) but also a larger police presence makes
confrontations between police and protesters (or
counter-protesters) more likely. Foreseeability of
harm often relates as much or more to the protest
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policing methods than to any act or instruction of the
protest organizer. Accord John D. McCarthy & Clark
McPhail, Places of Protest: The Public Forum in
Principle and Practice, 11 MOBILIZATION 229, 232–34
(2006) (describing police willingness to engage in
escalation at protests through the use of
less᠆than᠆lethal policing tactics). That risk is equally
predictable any time there is reason to believe
“outsiders” or counter-protesters, whose aim is to coopt or disrupt the protest event, will show up. This
scenario has played out at a number of recent protest
events, including the “Unite the Right” rallies in
Charlottesville, Virginia, in 2017.
The Fifth Circuit’s loose approach to civil liability
thus creates nearly endless opportunities for plaintiffs
(including injured counter-protesters seeking to chill
speech on the other side) to sue protest organizers for
money damages resulting from violent actions that the
protest organizers did not direct, incite, or authorize—
acts they likely were unaware of. Such tort liability
raises a host of problems for expressive activity. As the
Court has long recognized, tort liability can
significantly chill constitutionally protected speech.
See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 916–17; New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964).
Moreover, as Petitioner explains (Pet. at 33), the
unbounded nature of the tort inquiry invites juries to
make decisions based on content bias. And under the
Fifth Circuit’s approach, tort liability effectively—and
impermissibly—shifts responsibility for costs and
harms that protest organizers cannot control to
protest organizers. See Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist
Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–35 (1992) (protesters
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cannot be charged for the costs created by counterprotesters that voice their opposition, even counterprotesters whose appearance heightens the risk of
violence).
The Fifth Circuit’s expansive theory of tort
liability, if left to stand, will suppress expression by a
diverse array of protesters and protest groups. Prolife, pro-gun, environmental, social justice, and other
protest groups may find themselves defendants in
costly negligence suits, based on the unauthorized and
un-ratified unlawful acts of participants or
counter᠆protesters. Every organizer of a significant
march will face substantial and, in many cases,
crippling civil liability. Organizers of the Women’s
March, the annual protesters of the Court’s decision in
Roe v. Wade, and the youth organizers promoting
sensible gun control would all be at risk. Damages in
such suits would extend beyond personal injury, to any
“foreseeable” property damage or other harm. This
would return us to a time when courts routinely
imposed stifling civil liability judgments on public
protesters. And it would facilitate abuse of negligence
law, including suits aimed at silencing protest
messages and political movements.
The Court should grant certiorari to prevent tort
liability from once again becoming a weapon of
suppression. “The rights of political association are
fragile enough without adding the additional threat of
destruction by lawsuit.” Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S
at 931–32 (quoting NAACP v. Overstreet, 384 U.S. 118,
122 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting from dismissal of
certiorari)).
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*****
“First Amendment freedoms need breathing
space to survive.” FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551
U.S. 449, 468–69, (2007) (op. of Roberts, C.J.) (quoting
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). This
includes the freedom of assembly. This nation owes a
“huge debt . . . to its ‘troublemakers.’” Garcia v.
Bloomberg, 865 F. Supp. 2d 478, 482 (S.D.N.Y 2012),
rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Garcia v. Does, 779
F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2015). “Prudence and respect for the
constitutional rights to free speech and free
association, . . . dictate that the legal system cut all
non-violent protesters a fair amount of slack.” Id.
Permitting nearly universal liability “for the violent
act of a rogue assailant” would “impos[e] ruinous
financial liability against citizens for exercising core
First Amendment freedoms.” Pet. App. 53a (Willett, J.,
dissenting in relevant part). By ignoring the realities
of modern protest in which it is exceptionally easy to
run afoul of some legal regulation, the Fifth Circuit’s
novel theory of negligence chills not only
“troublemakers,” but anyone seeking to take to the
streets to peacefully voice their grievances. This is a
grave error and an unprecedented departure from the
long-standing American tradition of protecting
peaceable assembly.
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CONCLUSION
The Court should grant the petition for writ of
certiorari.
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